

Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados, 1989 to 1999*

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Abstract:
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This paper examines the structure of agenda power in the Brazilian *Câmara dos Deputados* (Chamber of Deputies). Our main question concerns when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by shifting majorities, has emerged in the post-1988 *Câmara*. Consistent agenda control emerges routinely in parliamentary regimes: the government commands a majority in the assembly; the legislative agenda is negotiated among the governing parties, typically with each able to “veto” the placement of bills on the agenda. However, the *Câmara* faces an external executive, the president, with substantial formal powers to set its agenda. Consistent agenda control thus can emerge only if the president chooses to ally with a majority coalition in the assembly. If the president always chose to form such an alliance—a presidentially-led agenda cartel—then one would expect some consistently parliamentary patterns in Brazil: the appointment of legislative party leaders to the cabinet; the use of statutes rather than decrees to achieve policy goals; the avoidance of bills that would pass and split the governing coalition. We find that only the Cardoso presidency displays consistent evidence of such a presidentially-led agenda cartel. In this sense, our argument differs from that of Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2000), who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a parliamentary mode of governance in Brazil. Yet it also differs from those who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a shifting-coalitions strategy. Our results suggest that presidents make a strategic choice, with much hinging on that choice.

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Introduction

Just as the power of nomination is fundamental in understanding the electoral process (cf. Schattschneider 1977 [1942]), so the power of agenda-setting is fundamental in understanding the legislative process. And just as political parties are central in the process of nomination, so they are central in the process of agenda-setting. Indeed, Döring (1995) has argued that governments in parliamentary systems to varying extents *monopolize* agenda power, while Cox and McCubbins (1993; 2002) have argued that the majority party in the U.S. House of Representatives constitutes a “legislative leviathan” that *cartelizes* agenda power.

In this paper, we explore agenda power in the Brazilian *Câmara dos Deputados* (Chamber of Deputies). This case is interesting for several reasons. First, divided government seems to interfere with the smooth operation of agenda cartels, both in parliamentary (Cox, Masuyama and McCubbins 2000) and presidential (Cox and McCubbins 2002) systems—and Brazil exhibits frequent divided government. Second, the Brazilian president exerts extraordinary power over the legislative agenda yet is not himself a member of the *Câmara*. This sets the structure of agenda power in Brazil apart both from most parliamentary cases (which feature executive-legislative fusion) and from the U.S. presidential case (where the president has no formal power to set the legislative agenda).

Our main question concerns when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by shifting majorities, has emerged in the post-1988 *Câmara*. Consistent agenda control emerges routinely in parliamentary regimes: the

government commands a majority in the assembly; the legislative agenda is negotiated among the governing parties, typically with each able to “veto” the placement of bills on the agenda. However, the *Câmara* faces an external executive, the president, with substantial formal powers to set its agenda. Consistent agenda control thus can emerge only if the president chooses to ally with a majority coalition in the assembly *and* agree to an agenda pursuant to negotiations within the coalition. Something like this subordination of presidential powers to coalition maintenance appears in Chile (Siavelis 2002). What about Brazil?

Some Brazilian presidents choose to assemble support coalitions in the legislature but do not routinely subordinate their agenda power to the coalition’s collective leadership. One consequence is that parties in the president’s support coalition have no guaranteed right to “veto” the placement of bills on the legislative agenda, as their parliamentary counterparts typically would. Other Brazilian presidents, in contrast, choose to build a deeper, parliamentary-style support in the legislature. The president typically cements his coalition by distributing positions in his cabinet to key party politicians; and coordinating the exercise of his agenda powers with his partners (Ames 2001, p. 162-167; Amorim Neto 2002; Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; 2000). In this way, the president can combine his own agenda powers with those of a legislative majority and the coalition thus formed can operate more or less along parliamentary lines; that is, supporters in Congress do not push bills opposed by the president, nor does the president push bills opposed by pivotal supporters.

Note that our argument is sometimes at odds with that of Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2000), who view *all* recent Brazilian presidents as operating in a parliamentary mode. We explore the pattern of use of agenda powers in the 1989-1999 period, finding

that the integration of executive and legislative agenda power is comprehensive only during Cardoso's presidency. While we agree that Brazilian presidents prior to Cardoso did not operate wholly by buying votes on an issue by issue basis (i.e., on the spot market for votes), neither can they accurately be described as akin to parliamentary coalition leaders. Thus, we view Brazilian legislative outcomes as depending crucially on the strategic choice by the president of how to build and maintain legislative coalitions (cf. Amorim Neto 1998; Cox and Morgenstern 2001).

The cartel thesis

Agenda power is concentrated

Cox and McCubbins (1993; 2002) have argued that the majority party in the U.S. House of Representatives cartelizes agenda power in the following way: (1) The majority party supports the endowment of various offices in the House—principally the Speakership, committee chairs and seats on the Rules Committee—with agenda-setting power; (2) The majority party ensures that only its members are committee chairs, that it gets a disproportionate share of seats on the Rules Committee, and that it always elects the Speaker. Agenda power is sometimes more centralized (with the Speaker wielding more agenda power) and sometimes less centralized (with the chairs and/or Rules Committee wielding more agenda power). But the majority always retains its near-monopoly on the formal positions endowed with agenda power.

In parliamentary systems, similar structures of agenda control sometimes arise. Usually, ministers are formally endowed with the most important special agenda powers

(cf. Döring 1995, 2001; Laver and Shepsle 1996); and all ministers are by definition members of the governing coalition.¹

Agenda power is delegated

The offices formally endowed with agenda power are awarded to party leaders through various competitive processes (most commonly, elections). The important point to stress is that, regardless of the details of the processes by which party leaders are chosen, occupants of agenda-setting offices exercise their power as *agents* of their parties, subject to removal for sufficiently bad behavior (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

In particular, procedural cartels typically allocate plum posts according to two principles: first, pivotal elements of the cartel—e.g., factions whose departure would deprive the cartel of a majority—each receive a large enough share of agenda power so that they can usually veto the placement of bills upon the plenary agenda on the issues they most care about; second, holders of plum posts risk removal if they disobey the first commandment of coalitional leadership: *Thou shalt not push bills that will split thy coalition.*

Given these two principles, the structure of agenda power inhibits the appearance of bills on the floor that would seriously split the governing coalition. That is, we define procedural cartels as combining a *concentration* of agenda power in particular offices with the *delegation* of those offices to party leaders via a process that ensures minimally fiduciary behavior. The concentration of agenda power in plum posts creates prizes with which to reward political entrepreneurs who solve collective action problems. The

¹ Chairs of committees sometimes also have agenda power and these posts, as in Japan and the Scandinavian countries, are sometimes not monopolized by the governing party or coalition.

delegation of that agenda power to party leaders (hence, the possibility of its retraction) provides them with a reason to serve the collective interests of their party or coalition.

The problem of external agenda power

The picture of highly concentrated agenda power depicted above plays best in polities without separated powers. Indeed, most of the research on agenda power and coalition formation has concentrated on parliamentary systems or on the U.S., whose president has far weaker agenda-setting powers than most Latin American executives (Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart and Haggard 2001).

Different sorts of division of power can complicate the picture. In bicameral systems, each chamber may be able to influence the other's internal agenda. Something of this sort appears to be true in Japan and the U.S., when the chambers are controlled by different parties (Cox, Masuyama, and McCubbins 2000; Campbell, Cox and McCubbins 2002). Similarly, in the U.S. the president is able to influence the Senate's agenda, even when the Senate is controlled by the opposition (Campbell, Cox and McCubbins 2002).

Brazil features an external actor—the president—who cannot necessarily command a majority in the legislature but can greatly influence the legislative agenda. From a comparative perspective, then, it is a logical place to look in examining the consequences of external agenda power on the internal organization of agenda power in legislatures.

Brazil's legislative process

In this section, we review Brazil's legislative process with an eye on agenda power. After surveying the basics of the system, we focus on the structure of internal (legislative) and external (presidential) agenda power. Our main points are simple: agenda power is

concentrated in Brazil and it is delegated to party leaders; however, an external agent—the president—also wields substantial independent power over the agenda.

Basics

Brazil has a bicameral legislature. The lower house, the *Câmara*, is currently composed of 513 members elected by open-list PR in 27 multimember districts. The upper house, the Federal Senate, has 81 members, 3 from each state, elected by plurality rule. Although the powers of the two houses are symmetric, we shall only consider the Chamber of Deputies. For the purposes of this paper, this is certainly the most important branch of the Brazilian Congress because the 1988 Constitution stipulates that all legislative proposals made by the president must be initiated in the *Câmara*.

Individual members are entitled to introduce bills in the lower house. Any legislative initiative is referred to the committee under whose jurisdiction it falls. Committees can either approve (totally or partially), amend, or reject bills submitted to their consideration or even propose a wholesale substitute proposal to the bill under consideration. The 1988 Constitution attempted to strengthen the role of committees by endowing them with the prerogative to enact bills (under some specified circumstances) without reporting them to the floor. Should a bill be either approved or not enacted by the committee, then it is referred to the floor for consideration by the full Chamber. Floor amendments to the bill are put to a vote first. Then, the whole bill (*project* in Brazil's legislative jargon) is voted on globally (*em globo*, in Portuguese), up or down.

There are three types of votes in the Chamber of Deputies: secret votes, voice votes, and roll call votes. Secret votes are taken on motions to overturn presidential vetoes, motions to set up investigative committees, and impeachment trials of presidents, legislators, and judges. Voice votes are convenient and frequent but any deputy can, after

the result of a voice vote is announced, request a quorum count to verify the presence of a majority. A quorum count request supported by at least 6% of the Chamber membership triggers a roll call vote. Support by 10% of the Chamber membership is required for a separate roll call on amendments. Quorum counts and roll calls are usually requested by opposition parties so as to force the majority to publicly disclose its position. However, there is a limit to the opposition's ability to request quorum counts. The Chamber's standing orders allow that a quorum count can be requested only one hour after the result of a previous roll call is proclaimed. This rule is designed to prevent the opposition from paralyzing floor decision-making by requesting quorum counts all the time.

Legislative Agents and Agenda Control

Despite these unusual constitutional powers, Brazilian committees are relatively weak, often overruled by party leaders' petitions to discharge bills by means of urgency requests (Pereira and Mueller 2000) (we will elaborate more on urgency requests below). In contrast, political parties, despite being very weak in the electorate (Mainwaring 1999, p.88-174), are important in the organization of legislative business in the lower house, along with the Mesa Diretora (the Chamber's steering board) (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; 2000). Article 175 of the standing orders stipulates that the Mesa chair (the presiding officer of the Chamber) organizes the legislative agenda in consultation with the so-called College of Leaders. This is the most important decision-making body of the lower chamber. It is composed of leaders of parties commanding at least 1.0% of seats and the government leader (the president is entitled to appoint a deputy to act in his name and to make vote recommendations to the floor). The standing orders stipulate that the College's decisions should be made preferably by consensus. If consensus is not possible, however, decisions are to be made by an absolute majority of votes, each vote weighted by the

percent of seats held by each leader's party. A party leader's signature also carries the weight of her party delegation on a petition to request a roll call or urgent consideration. Such procedural rights to represent their delegations give party leaders considerable control over the floor, and helps centralize decision making in Brazil's otherwise highly fragmented legislature (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000, p.164-165).

Another rule enshrined in the standing orders that strengthens party leaders and weakens committees concerns "urgency." There are two types of urgency motion: simple urgency and super urgency.² Two-thirds of the Mesa membership, one-third of the Chamber membership (or party leaders representing this number) or two-thirds of a committee membership can request simple urgency on a bill. For simple urgency to be granted, a simple majority must support it in a voice vote. Simple urgency merely allows a bill to be voted on sometime in the same legislative session (a legislative session spans over five months). Moreover, only two bills can be considered under simple urgency per session.

Because of these restrictions, especially the last, simple urgency does not provide a regular means for the opposition to upset the governing coalition's agenda. However, on occasion the opposition can exploit the rule. As an example, consider the wealth tax in Cardoso's first presidency. When Cardoso was a left-leaning senator in the late 1980s, he sponsored a bill taxing wealth. This bill was held up in committee for a good while. When Cardoso took the presidency in 1995, supported by a center-right coalition, the leftist opposition decided to challenge him by requesting urgency on his long-forgotten bill. The

² Super urgency is our translation from the Portuguese of what in the Brazilian legislative jargon is called *urgência urgentíssima*.

Cardoso coalition was against it. Much to Cardoso's embarrassment, his coalition leaders closed ranks to defeat the request on the floor.

As for the super urgency motion, it must be requested by means of a petition signed by either an absolute majority of the Chamber membership or party leaders representing this number. In most of the cases, it is the party leaders who sign the petitions. To be granted, a super urgency petition must be approved by an absolute majority of the Chamber membership in a floor vote. In case super urgency is granted on a bill, the latter is immediately discharged from committee and goes to the top of the floor's voting schedule.³ Thus, super urgency requests endow floor majorities with a tight hold on the legislative agenda and weaken the agenda power of committees. Figueiredo and Limongi (1999, p. 58) report that, of the 514 laws enacted by the Congress in 1989-1994, 282 (55.0%) were urgently considered in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Role of the President

Brazil's 1988 Constitution gives the president a key role in lawmaking. The president has the right to propose bills and constitutional amendments on any topic and has *exclusive* legislative initiative in a host of areas, particularly those pertaining to public administration, tax policy, and the budget. The president also has the prerogative to partially or totally veto bills passed by the Congress (presidential vetoes are overridden by an absolute majority in a joint session of Congress). Furthermore, the president's constitutional prerogative to issue provisional measures (or decree-laws) enables him to exert considerable control over the legislative process.

³ Super urgency appears analogous to special rules in the U.S. House, with the *Mesa* in the role of the Rules Committee.

Provisional measures are presidential decrees with the immediate force of law. Once a provisional measure is issued, the Congress has 30 days to vote on it. If the Congress does not take any action in this period, the provisional measure elapses. In most cases, the Brazilian Congress has failed to promptly deliberate on provisional measures. However, a Supreme Court ruling in 1989 authorized the executive to re-issue provisional measures that the Congress had not considered in due time (Figueiredo and Limongi 1997).⁴ The executive was quick to seize this opportunity. Not surprisingly, of the 3,412 provisional measures emitted between October 1988 and February 1999, only 498 (14.6%) were original documents. Only 20 of these 498 original measures were voted down by the Congress (9 issued by Sarney, 10 by Collor, and 1 by Cardoso).⁵ Moreover, the executive has been resorting to provisional measures to legislate on all kinds of policy areas in any context, despite the fact that the Constitution states that provisional measures should deal only with urgent and relevant matters. For example, even fishing rights in the Amazon River have been regulated by provisional measures. In short, presidential decrees have become a powerful policy-making instrument because they allow the executive to unilaterally change the status quo.⁶

According to Figueiredo and Limongi (2000), “Rights to exclusivity and the power to issue decrees with the immediate force of law give the executive the capacity to control the legislative agenda in both its time and content” (p. 156). The data presented by the authors show that no less than 86% of the bills enacted in 1989-1997 were sponsored by the executive.

⁴ Note that in September 2001 the Brazilian Congress enacted a constitutional amendment determining that provisional measures would have to be voted on in 60 days, and could be re-issued only once.

⁵ These figures were culled from Brazil – Senado Federal (1999).

Finally, the president is constitutionally entitled to request urgent consideration of his legislative proposals. There is no vote on the issue of granting urgency to the president. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have 45 days to deliberate on any bill deemed urgent by the president. Should either house fail to meet this deadline, the executive bill is immediately put to a vote. In case one of the houses amends the bill, the other house has 10 days to decide on the amendments. Available evidence shows that 53% of the executive-initiated bills enacted by the Congress in 1989-1994 were urgently considered in the lower chamber. Also, in this same period urgently considered executive bills took on average 26 days to be shuttled to the Senate (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; p.62-63). Unfortunately, it is not known how many urgency requests were actually made by the president himself or by his legislative allies. At any rate, the grant of urgency has been a key mechanism to expedite deliberation on the executive's legislative agenda.

The Role of the parties

Given the legislative prerogatives of the executive, we claim that in Brazil the value to the legislative parties of forming an agenda cartel is limited. If the president is not included in the cartel, then he can use urgency requests and decree-laws to disrupt the cartel's plans. While it is possible to imagine a U.S. House pushing through a legislative program of its own, largely against presidential wishes—as for example in the 100th Congress—such a scenario is not plausible in Brazil. Thus, we should not expect purely legislative cartels to form.

However, the president does not necessarily want to go it alone. By combining his powers with theirs, forming what we call a presidentially-led agenda cartel, he can hope to

⁶ On the politics of provisional measures in Brazil, see Amorim Neto and Tafner (2002), Figueiredo and Limongi (1997; 1999; 2000), Monteiro (2000), Power (1998), and Reich (2002). On decree powers in a

manage a more ambitious legislative programme and implement more of his policy goals via statute (cf. Amorim Neto 1998). Thus, the president has an incentive to cooperate with legislative actors who possess agenda power. In this paper, we consider in more detail whether presidentially-led agenda cartels have appeared in Brazil.

Identifying cartels

How can we determine whether agenda cartels exist or not? In this section, we describe an approach to answering this question that depends on the pattern of party losses on final passage and agenda-setting votes. Developed originally for the U.S. (cf. Cox and McCubbins 2002) and Japan (Cox, Masuyama and McCubbins 2000), we adapt it here for use in Brazil.

Rolls

Begin by dividing all final passage votes into two categories—bills that pass and those that fail. If a (majority of a) party votes against a bill that nonetheless passes, we say that the party has been *rolled*. Think of a legislative train leaving the station and a party that has tried to stop it—but been run over. Prior to the final passage stage, there are also sometimes clear agenda-setting votes—that is, votes to determine whether the legislature will or will not consider in plenary session a particular bill. We also speak of parties being rolled on these initial agenda-setting motions, when they vote against them but the motion nonetheless passes.

The spatial model of legislative voting

Our method of detecting agenda cartels depends on the pattern of rolls across the left-right ideological spectrum on which the parties are arrayed. To explain the technique, we need to introduce some basics of spatial modeling. We imagine that there are a large

comparative perspective, see Carey and Shugart (1998).

number of policy instruments that the government of a country can set to various values; the amount of money the government printing presses print per month; the minimum wage; the tax rate on purchases of various sorts; the pay rate in the armed forces; and so on. Each policy issue is represented by a dimension in Euclidian n -space, where n is the number of issues or instruments.

On each dimension j , there is a status quo point, q_j , representing the current policy. For example, $q_j = .3$ might indicate the current marginal tax rate on a particular class of income. We assume that, if the assembly does not change policy j , then the status quo remains in force (though other reversions could in principle be accommodated).

On each dimension j , each party k has an ideal point, denoted z_{jk} . We assume for simplicity that parties' preferences over policies are additively separable, and normalize so that the furthest left party is located at -1 , while the furthest-right party is located at $+1$.

To illustrate the argument, we confine attention to the special case defined by the following conditions. First, there are five parties—1, 2, 3, 4 and 5—in left-to-right order on all dimensions. That is, $z_{j1} < z_{j2} < z_{j3} < z_{j4} < z_{j5}$ for all j . Moreover, we assume that party 3 contains the median legislator. Second, the status quo point on dimension j , q_j , is chosen by Nature by drawing from a distribution with support on the interval $[z_{j1} - 1, z_{j5} + 1]$. Thus, the distribution of status quo points will range more widely than the distribution of parties' ideal positions. Third, the assembly considers only unidimensional bills, that is, those dealing with exactly one issue. Fourth, all members of a given party have identical preferences.

Roll rates

With this background and specific example in mind, consider the case in which the plenary agenda is decided on the floor by majority vote. Given this complete dispersion of

agenda power, the median party will be able to move any status quo point q_j to its ideal point. If q_j lies to the left of $2z_{j1} - z_{j3}$, then no party will be rolled. If q_j lies in the interval $[2z_{j1} - z_{j3}, 2z_{j2} - z_{j3}]$, then party 1 will be rolled. If q_j lies in the interval $[2z_{j2} - z_{j3}, z_{j3}]$, then both parties 1 and 2 will be rolled. If q_j lies in the interval $[z_{j3}, 2z_{j4} - z_{j3}]$, then parties 4 and 5 will be rolled. If q_j lies in the interval $[2z_{j4} - z_{j3}, 2z_{j5} - z_{j3}]$, then party 5 will be rolled. Finally, if q_j lies to the right of z_{j5} , then no party will be rolled. Figure 1 illustrates the zones just mentioned, noting which parties are rolled.

[Figure 1 about here.]

The general conclusion from the specific comments just made is simple. If the plenary agenda is constructed via shifting majorities on the floor, then a party's roll rate increases as its ideal point becomes more extreme relative to the median party's ideal. *The median party is never rolled, while roll rates increase monotonically both to the left and to the right.*

Contrast this result with what happens if there is an agenda cartel composed of parties 3, 4 and 5. For present purposes, we define an agenda cartel as a coalition of two or more parties that together hold a majority of seats and delegate agenda-setting power to various of their leaders; these leaders, in turn, exercise their delegated agenda-setting power in obedience to the first commandment of coalitional leadership—*Thou shalt not split thy coalition*. In other words, the agenda-setting agents of the procedural cartel use their power to block bills that would both pass and produce an overt split in the coalition on one or more roll calls (leading potentially to the departure of the offended member(s) from the

cartel). In terms of rolls, a procedural cartel is defined here as acting to prevent any of its member parties being rolled on agenda-setting or final passage votes.

Given this definition of a procedural cartel, all three members of our hypothetical cartel—parties 3, 4 and 5—will have zero roll rates. If preferences are not known completely, then cartel parties can have non-zero but still “small” roll rates. The opposition parties’ roll rates will, as in the first no-cartel case, increase with their distance from party 3.

Much the same results arise when the parties are not always ordered the same way on all dimensions, when bills can be multidimensional, and when there is diversity of opinion within parties. *If there is no cartel, a party’s roll rate increases as it becomes more extreme. If there is a cartel, some relatively extreme parties’ roll rates are brought down to the low rates observed for the centrally located parties.*

Thus, our first criterion for identifying the existence of a presidentially-led cartel—a necessary condition for declaring such a cartel to exist—is that there exist a set of parties that together hold a majority of seats and that each have near-zero roll rates.⁷ If this criterion is met by a particular coalition, we shall then additionally seek evidence that (1) the president has sought to deal with the leaders of this coalition, by appointing them to his cabinet; and (2) the president has sought to achieve his legislative goals through the enactment of statutes (and constitutional amendments), rather than merely through the issuance of decrees. If a coalition has low roll rates, and secures a good representation in the cabinet of a president who seeks statutes rather than decrees, we shall consider it to be a cartel. In some cases, we can also provide qualitative evidence of other sorts to complement our more systematic data.

Before turning to the data, we note how some previous characterizations of Brazilian politics relate to our two polar models. If Brazilian presidents always act like leaders of multiparty coalitions in a parliamentary system, per Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2000), then one would expect *always* to find agenda cartels. If, on the other hand, Brazilian presidents always cobble together shifting coalitions and do not subordinate their agenda powers to the necessity of coalition maintenance, more in line with Ames (2001), then one would expect *never* to find agenda cartels. In the next section, we shall see which, if either, of these expectations is borne out.

Roll rates in Brazil

Data

To identify presidentially-led cartels we will analyze roll call votes on projects and on agenda-setting motions.⁸ A roll call on a project is equivalent to a final passage vote in the U.S. The main form of agenda-setting motion is an urgency request; however, we include others as well.⁹

As there are many small parties in the Brazilian Chamber, we focus here on the roll rates only for Brazil's "big seven" parties: the PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), PFL (Party of the Liberal Front), PSDB (Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy), PT (Workers' Party), PPB (Brazilian Progressive Party),¹⁰ PDT (Democratic

⁷ Practically speaking, research on parliamentary systems suggests that "near zero" means "below 5%."

⁸ Note that by focusing on roll calls a good deal of information on floor decisions will be lost because, as mentioned, there are also secret votes and voice votes in Brazil. However, roll calls do constitute a sample of the most controversial decisions made on the floor (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999).

⁹ The agenda-setting votes that we include are: urgency requests, petitions to anticipate consideration of a bill, the admissibility of a presidential decree, petitions to prorogate a legislative session, proposals to dismember a bill, petitions to end a floor debate, petitions to withdraw an urgency request, petitions to withdraw bills from the agenda, proposals to vote on a report on a bill, and petitions to nullify the enactment of a bill by a committee, and petitions to give priority to a bill.

¹⁰ The PPB was formed in 1995 as a result of the merger of the PPR and the PP. The PP was created in 1993 by the merger of the PST and PTR. The PPR resulted from the merger of the PDS and the PDC in 1993. For

Labor Party), and PTB (Brazilian Labor Party). These seven parties held together approximately 96.0% of lower chamber seats in the 1987-1991 legislature, 77.0% in 1991-1995, and 83.0% in 1995-1999.

Despite being often characterized as mostly clientelistic organizations, Brazilian parties can be safely arrayed along a left-right continuum (Coppedge 1997; Figueiredo and Limongi 1999, p.101-123; Mainwaring 1999, p.88-135; Rosas and Zechmeister 2000). It is the consensus among scholars that, on the left is the PT; on the center-left, the PDT and PSDB; in the center, the PMDB, on the center-right, the PTB; and on the right, the PFL and PPB.

Finally, as legislative and presidential terms in Brazil were not concurrent before 1994, our roll-call sample will be divided by legislative-presidential period. The period for which we have roll call data (January 1989 – January 1999) covers 3 legislatures and 4 presidencies. The legislatures are the following: 48th (February 1987 – January 1991), 49th (February 1991 – January 1995), 50th (February 1995 – January 1999). The presidencies are: Sarney (March 1985 – March 1990), Collor (March 1990 – October 1992), Franco (October 1992 – January 1995), and Cardoso (January 1995 – January 1999).¹¹ Thus, there are 6 legislative-presidential periods: (1) 48th-Sarney (January 1989-March 1990), (2) 48th-Collor (March 1990 – January 1991), (3) 49th-Collor (February 1991 - October 1992), (4) 49th-Franco (October 1992 – December 1994), (5) 49th-Cardoso (January 1995), and (6) 50th-Cardoso (February 1995 – January 1999). We ignore 49th-Cardoso in what follows, as it spans only one month.

the purpose of simplicity the Figueiredo and Limongi roll-call data bank treats all these right-wing parties as a single party for the whole 1989-1999 period. In this paper we follow their procedure.

¹¹ Recall that Collor was removed from office on corruption charges in October 1992, having been replaced by his vice mate Franco. The president's term was reduced from 5 to 4 years in 1994. That is why Sarney

Results

Roll rates on project and agenda-setting votes by legislative-presidential period and party are displayed in Table 1 below. The first step is to determine whether there is a U-shaped pattern to rolls, as expected in the absence of a stable agenda cartel, or whether there is a majority coalition all of whose members exhibit near-zero roll rates, as expected in the presence of a stable agenda cartel. Surveying the data in Table 1, U-shaped patterns appear in 48th-Sarney, 49th-Collor, and 49th-Franco.¹¹ Winning coalitions in these periods were most often right-connected; that is, the winning parties consisted of all those to the right of a certain point on the left-right spectrum. However, left-connected winning coalitions, consisting of all those to the left of a given point, also appeared with some frequency. This is consistent with the supposition that presidents chose different allies on different issues, as best suited their immediate needs; or with the supposition that legislative initiatives came from both the left and the right, with some of each succeeding; or both.

[Table 1 about here.]

In 48th-Collor, there is not a U-shaped pattern to roll rates. However, the three right-wing parties with low roll rates—the PTB, PFL and PPB—did not by themselves constitute a majority. Moreover, including the centrist PMDB with the right-wing parties does produce a majority but the PMDB was rolled on 18.2% of the project and agenda-

served for 5 years, while Cardoso served for 4 in his first term. Cardoso was elected for a second four-year term in October 1998.

setting votes—too high a figure to picture it as a member in good standing of an agenda cartel.

This leaves only one period, 50th-Cardoso, that satisfies our initial criterion identifying the existence of a procedural cartel. In this period, the parties PSDB, PMDB, PTB, PFL and PPB all have relatively low roll rates (all but the PPB's at or below 5%)¹² and there is no systematic trend in their roll rates across the ideological spectrum. The opposition parties, in contrast, have quite high roll rates.

Cabinet construction and choice of policy instrument in Brazil

Having looked at roll rates, we next turn to two other clues as to the president's legislative strategy. If the president has decided to form a stable legislative majority and govern through it, then one should find that he tends (1) to construct his cabinet out of partisan rather than technocratic materials and also (2) to prefer standard lawmaking procedures to decrees.

Cabinet construction

The appointment of party politicians to the cabinet has been considered the president's key instrument to build legislative support in Brazil (Ames 2001, p. 162-167; Amorim Neto 2002; Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; 2000). We claim that the better is a party's representation in the cabinet, the lower its roll rate will be. This might follow because cabinet positions are bribes that buy parties' votes; or because cabinet positions indicate who the president's legislative partners are, with each partner able—as in a parliamentary government—to veto objectionable legislation.

¹¹ Pooling all the data from these three periods, the Spearman correlation between a party's ordinal distance from the center and its roll rate is .93 (for the PMDB and all parties to the left) and .70 (for the PMDB and all parties to the right). Both correlations are significant at the .01 level.

To measure a party's representation in the cabinet, we employ two different statistics. Our first measure is *Cabinet Time Per Seat*. For example, imagine a cabinet with 20 ministries. If a given party heads one ministry the whole year, and another ministry during half of the year, the cabinet time spent by the party is $(365 + \frac{1}{2} * 365) / (20 * 365) = 0.075$.¹³ Dividing this figure by the legislative size of the party in the lower chamber gives the *Cabinet Time Per Seat*.¹⁴

Cabinet time, however, tells us about only the bare bones of parties' representation in the executive branch. To add some flesh, we consider the budget resources allocated to parties by presidents, using an indicator devised by Amorim Neto and Santos (2001). This measure counts the percent of time a party heads each ministry per year and multiplies it by the percent share of the civilian budget spent by each ministry in the year. The values are then added up. For example, suppose a party headed ministry X the whole year, and ministry Y during half of the year. If ministry X spent 20% of the civilian budget, and ministry Y 10%, then the party was allocated $20\% + 10\% * \frac{1}{2} = 25\%$ of the civilian budget in the year Y. Dividing this figure by the party's legislative seat share yields our second measure of cabinet representation, *Budget Share Per Seat*.¹⁵

¹² The PPB probably has a roll rate slightly above 5% because it only joined Cardoso's cabinet in April 1996.

¹³ Data on the party affiliation (if any) of cabinet ministers were culled from Abreu et al. (2001), and provided by Antônio Octávio Cintra and José L. M. Dias. Additional sources include: for Sarney: *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. 31, n. 6, 1985, p. 33642-33650; *Veja* (a weekly magazine) February 12, 1986, p. 16-21; *Veja*, January 11, 1989, p. 34-36; for Collor: *Veja*, March 14, 1990, p. 26-31; *Veja*, April 15, 1992, p. 18-26; for Franco: *Veja*, October 7, 1992, p. 34-49; *Jornal do Brasil* (a Rio de Janeiro-based daily newspaper), August 20, 1993; p. 2; *Jornal do Brasil*, August 21, 1993, p. 4; *Jornal do Brasil*, August 29, 1993, p. 12; for Cardoso: *Istoé* (a weekly magazine), January 4, 1995, p. 21-2.

¹⁴ Note that, given frequent party jumping in Brazil, we used the yearly legislative size of the parties to calculate the cabinet time per seat.

¹⁵ Data on budgetary expenditures in 1993-1998 were provided by the *Secretaria de Orçamento Federal* (Federal Budget Office) upon e-mail request. For the 1989-1992 period the source was Brazil – Ministério da Fazenda (N.d.).

The dependent variable is the yearly number of rolls of each of the seven big parties in 1989-1998, thus generating a sample with $7 \times 10 = 70$ observations. As our *explanandum* is a frequency count variable, we ran an extended beta-binomial model (Palmquist 1999). Given the panel structure of the sample, we included the first-order lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation to control for auto-correlation in the residuals.¹⁶ We also include six dummies to control for the parties' fixed effects, using the PMDB as the baseline. These dummies allow us to check whether a party's ideological distance from the center (which we know ordinarily from conventional left-right placements of the parties) is positively associated with its roll frequency.

[Table 2 about here.]

Table 2 displays our results, which support two main conclusions. First, the better is a party's cabinet representation—measured either by *Cabinet Time Per Seat* or *Budget Share Per Seat*—the lower is its frequency of rolls per year. The former effect (which takes account only of time spent in the cabinet) is statistically significant at the .10 level, the latter (which weights each Ministry by its budget share) at the .01 level. Second, the greater the ideological distance of a party from the center, the higher its roll rate tends to be. This effect is stronger for the left-wing than for the right-wing parties because at least one right-wing party was always represented in the cabinet (the PFL served on the cabinet every year in 1989-1999); and 2 of the 4 presidents were right-of-center (Sarney and Collor);—thus insulating to a great extent even opposition right-wing parties from unwanted policy proposals.

¹⁶ Because we include a lag, the number of observations falls to 63. All our results are qualitatively similar if no lags are included.

There are two good reasons to prefer the *Budget Share Per Seat* variable to the less informative *Cabinet Time Per Seat*. First, when we include both variables in the analysis, the coefficient on *Budget Share Per Seat* is largely unaffected (and retains its significance), while that on *Cabinet Time Per Seat* becomes small and insignificant. Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the overall fit of the model is perceptibly better when we weight cabinet time by budget share than when we do not. Thus, we conclude that each Ministry's budget share is a good clue to its importance. Corroborating this view, the bigger a legislative party's budget share is, the more tightly linked it is to the president, both in terms of its voting cohesion (per Amorim Neto and Santos 2001) and in terms of its roll rate (per Table 2).

The substantive impact of variations in a party's *Budget Share Per Seat* is illustrated in Figure 2, which arrays the seven main parties from left to right along the horizontal axis. Two different roll rates are plotted along the vertical axis: first, the roll rate that the model predicts, if the party's budget share per seat is zero (it is not in government at all); second, the roll rate that the model predicts, if the party's budget share per seat is unity (i.e., it gets a budget share equal to its seat share).¹⁷ We shall call these two roll rates the "opposition" and "government" roll rates, respectively. Two things can be seen from the figure.

First, each party's predicted opposition roll rate (when its budget share per seat is zero) is higher than its predicted government roll rate (when its budget share per seat is unity). Subtracting each party's government roll rate from its opposition roll rate, the

¹⁷ One might argue that a budget share per seat of unity is too low to reflect full membership in the cabinet. After all, if only a fraction of the parties in the Chamber get into government, and they divide the full budget among themselves, each will have a higher-than-unity budget share per seat. However, Brazilian cabinets always contain non-party ministers, who take up a certain portion of the budget. Thus, a value of unity does reflect a "full" membership in the cabinet.

median figure is 11%. Averaging across the seven parties, a party is predicted to be rolled 63 percent more often when in the opposition than when in government.¹⁸

Second, roll rates tend to increase both to the right and especially to the left. The only exception to this pattern, in Model 2, concerns the PPB—whose predicted roll rates are *lower* than those of two parties to its left: the PTB and PFL. This unexpected result may stem from the fact that the label PPB in the Figueiredo and Limongi roll-call data bank is an artificial conflation of the labels of four other parties (PDS, PPR, PP, and PDC) that in different moments in time merged in pairs till they finally fused into the PPB in 1995 (see footnote 10). Such a conflation is bound to overstate the conservatism of some of these legislative cohorts, particularly that of the PDC and PP, which are defined by Coppedge (1997) and Mainwaring (1999, p. XVIII) as center-right rather than rightist parties. Ignoring the PPB, the other six parties “scale” perfectly.

[Figure 2 about here.]

Choice of policy instrument

We now turn to the second dimension of the president’s legislative strategy, his choice of policy-making instrument. In Brazil, this choice is between what we call standard lawmaking procedures (statute bills and constitutional amendments), on the one hand, and decree-laws, on the other.

If the president is able to form a legislative cartel, then he will typically have enough political support to pursue his legislative agenda by standard lawmaking procedures, rather than by decrees. If the president is unable or unwilling to form a cartel,

¹⁸ The increase in the roll rate is expressed here as a percentage of the government roll rate.

then his weak legislative support will predispose him to govern by a unilateral policy-making instrument, that is, decrees (Amorim Neto 1998).

To operationalize the degree to which presidents seek statutory or constitutional laws rather than decree-laws, Table 3 also provides the number of statutory bills, constitutional amendments and original decree-laws initiated by the executive per legislative-presidential period. The last column in Table 3 displays the ratio of all standard lawmaking initiatives of the executive (statutory bills + constitutional amendments) to the total legislative input of the executive (statutory bills + constitutional amendments + original decree-laws) per period, what we call the index of standard legislative initiatives (SLI). SLI varies between 0 and 1. The higher the score on SLI, the more presidents prefer to make policy via standard lawmaking procedures.

[Table 3 about here.]

As can be seen, two of the three *lowest* SLI values occur for the periods 48th-Sarney and 49th-Franco. In both these periods, there is a distinct U-shaped pattern on rolls. Also, the scores of the PMDB, PFL, and PSDB (the country's key governing parties in 1989-1998) on the cabinet representation measures indicate that they were mostly underrepresented in the executive branch, particularly with regard to budget expenditures, during these periods. Thus, all signs point to the lack of a consistent presidentially-led cartel in 48th-Sarney and 49th-Franco.

The second-*highest* value for SLI occurs in 50th-Cardoso. Moreover, under Cardoso the PFL and PSDB had their highest scores on *Budget Share Per Seat* in the whole 1989-1998 period; and we find the greatest stability in cabinet tenure of all the post-1988

presidencies. Thus, 50th-Cardoso is the only period in which we observe consistency between the design of the cabinet (partisan), presidential policy-making strategy (statutory/constitutional), and a strong cartel in project and agenda-setting votes (with low roll rates for all parties in the Cardoso coalition).¹⁹

Putting aside the cases clearly lacking a cartel (48th-Sarney and 49th-Franco) and the case clearly exhibiting a cartel (50th-Cardoso) leaves two somewhat odder cases, both involving Collor. In 48th-Collor, the president sought relatively few statutes, relying more on decrees. In 49th-Collor, the president relied heavily on statutes. Yet in neither period is there evidence of a cartel or of good representation of the key parties in the cabinet. We now discuss these two cases in somewhat greater detail.

48th-Collor

In 1990, the last year of the 48th legislature and first year of the Collor administration, the president staffed his cabinet mostly with technocrats and cronies. While the PFL had a cabinet time commensurate with its legislative size, the three key parties were either poorly represented or not represented at all as regards budget expenditures. Additionally, 48th-Collor is the period in which the executive was most heavily reliant on

¹⁹ It could be argued that if we also look at the number of decrees that were simply re-issued or were re-issued with modifications in their texts, the nice consistency between cabinet design and presidential policy-making found in 50th-Cardoso would evaporate. After all, Cardoso simply re-issued 1,997 decrees and re-issued 453 decrees with their texts modified, while Sarney re-issued 20 and modified 2, Collor re-emitted 20 and changed 21, and Franco re-issued 326 and modified 37. Presidents have to re-issue decrees when Congress does not vote on them in time. According to Amorim Neto and Tafner (2002), in general, Congress does not promptly deliberate on decrees so as not to waste its time on less relevant issues. Seventy percent of the decrees deal with minor questions relating to the grant of credits, transfers of budgetary appropriations, civil servants, and the organization of public administration. So when the executive re-issues a decree, this means that the Congress is implicitly delegating the executive powers to legislate on issues toward which the legislative majority is indifferent. Such delegation is more likely precisely when the president and the majority have colluded under a coalition agreement or, in the terms of this paper, have formed a presidentially-led cartel. As for the re-issuance of decrees with their texts modified, Amorim Neto and Tafner argue that this is a mechanism that allows deputies to make *ex post* amendments to original decrees, thus helping better coordinate the preferences of presidents and legislators who have colluded under a coalition agreement. The modifications effected in original decrees are designed precisely to address the demands

decrees (SLI = 0.47). Both these features suggest that the president did not seek to construct a cartel in this period. The evidence on roll rates partly confirms this view. Although the three rightist parties were never rolled, these parties did not constitute a majority and thus could not have controlled the College of Leaders alone. The centrist PMDB, moreover, was rolled on 18% of the project and agenda-setting votes in this period—with roll rates increasing monotonically as one moves further left.

We interpret the pattern of rolls—note on only eleven roll calls—as being consistent with a powerful and conservative president pursuing his own agenda without striking any special deals with a stable legislative majority. Collor had tremendous prestige as the first popularly elected president in 29 years. He also faced a clear national crisis, the superinflationary spiral of 1989-1990. His status and the crisis he faced gave him wide latitude to do what he could to stop inflation (Power 2000, p. 191-192). His policies to this end were indeed rightist but his attitude toward the legislative right was reportedly one of “studied dismissiveness” (Power 2000, p. 191). As the rightist parties did not command a majority, the passage of measures designed to stabilize the economy was only possible with the support provided by the PMDB’s right wing. However, the size of this faction was not enough to prevent the party from being rolled in some votes. That is why the PMDB has an above-cartel roll rate in 48th-Collor.

All told, the qualitative evidence suggests that the president merely offered a consistent menu of policies and let the legislative parties agree or not. There is no evidence that he sought to build a stable coalition combining College of Leaders powers with his own.

pressed by the government’s allies and not those of the opposition. As Cardoso led a strong cartel, this explains in part why he had the highest average of re-issued decrees with modified text.

49th-Collor

In 49th-Collor, there was a marked change in the president's policy-making strategy. Collor signed only 11 decrees but sponsored 204 statutes and 2 constitutional amendments. This period's score on SLI (0.95) is thus the highest for our entire period.

The scores on the cabinet representation measures, however, suggest that there was no presidential effort to cartelize the legislative agenda via the appointment of politicians from the key parties to big-budget ministries. Additionally, the pattern of rolls is U-shaped, first declining and then inclining as one moves from left to right. It is thus somewhat puzzling that Collor should have almost forsaken decrees and relied heavily on statutes, as typically presidents with non-partisan cabinets and no firm legislative majority tend to rely on decrees. How did this situation come about?

Note first that Collor actually tried to cooperate with some legislative parties by means other than by cabinet appointments. According to Power (2000, p.194),

With Collor's personal intervention in December [1990], Passarinho [a conservative senator] finally succeeded in creating the desired progovernment bloc in Congress. This was the first such bloc created under the Constitution of 1988, which explicitly permitted the formalization of legislative coalitions [...]. Called the Movimento Parlamentar Social Liberal [Social Liberal Parliamentary Movement] but known simply as Bloco, it was based formally on the PFL and PRN, but also received informal support from the PDS [later the PPB], PTB, PDC, and several microparties.

The Social Liberal Parliamentary Movement was cemented with the distribution of pork, particularly for the PFL deputies (Ames 2001, p.176-180). While the Parliamentary Movement certainly provided Collor with a firmer legislative basis than the one he had in

1990, the Bloco's parties never commanded a legislative majority in 1991-1992. So where could Collor obtain legislative support to approve 93.0% of the statutes he sent to Congress?²⁰

The answer appears to be that Collor struck a separate deal with the PDT. Indeed, the cooperation between Collor and the PDT was publicly avowed and cemented by side-payments.²¹ According to newspaper reports, the state of Rio de Janeiro, then governed by the PDT's main leader, Leonel Brizola, received 576 million dollars in federal grants in 1991 as a consequence of the Collor-PDT alliance.²² In return, the PDT's leaders in the Chamber of Deputies went from agreeing with Collor's vote recommendations 4.3% of the time in 48th-Collor, to 25.5% of the time in 49th-Collor. Interestingly, with the support from the PDT, which held 9.1% of lower chamber seats, the Social Liberal Parliamentary Movement (PFL + PRN + PDS + PTB + PDC = 44.2%) could provide Collor with a minimal winning majority of 53.3% of seats.

However, given that Brazilian parties are not perfectly disciplined, such a majority could never be taken for granted by Collor. This also means that the PMDB was still the pivotal party, and that Collor would have to come to terms with it. What the PMDB wanted the most was to have Collor stop issuing decrees as he did in 1990. In April 1991 the Chamber of Deputies nearly approved a bill sponsored by a PMDB deputy, Nelson Jobim, designed to place limits on presidential decree powers. Although the Jobim bill was defeated (by a very small margin), its message was clear, and seems to have impressed Collor and his advisers (Power 1998, p. 211). On top of it, in August 1991 the Chamber of

²⁰ Data provided by Argelina C. Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi.

²¹ See *O Globo* (a Rio de Janeiro-based daily newspaper), "Brizola promete ajudar Collor" (Brizola [leader of the PDT] promises to help Collor), March 8, 1991.

²² See *O Globo*, "Uma chuva de dinheiro no Rio" (a rain of money on Rio), May 23, 1991.

Deputies voted down a presidential decree granting pay increases to public servants and the military. On this occasion, the PFL, considered Collor's staunchest supporter, joined the opposition.

In short, the *Câmara*, in practical terms, broke Collor's decree powers. He was thus left with only the alternative of using standard legislative procedures—explaining the very high SLI score for 49th-Collor. To achieve a high approval rate of his statutory bills, Collor abandoned his most-preferred (and conservative) policies, as demonstrated by Ames (2001, p. 192-194); and distributed pork to both his main supporters (the PFL) and to a strange bedfellow (the PDT). What he did not do was to turn the Social Liberal Parliamentary Movement into an effective presidentially-led cartel.

Conclusion

Agenda power is to the legislative process what nomination power is to the electoral process. Both are crucial preliminary steps that can powerfully shape outputs. Write-in wonders aside—candidates cannot be elected, if they are not put on the ballot. *Leggine* and their ilk aside—bills cannot be enacted, if they are not put on the plenary agenda.

In stark contrast to the equality of legislative voting power, agenda power is highly concentrated in most of the world's legislatures. Formally delegated agenda powers fall predominantly to members of the government in parliamentary systems; and to members of the majority party in the U.S.

Yet, the delegation of agenda power is complicated in Latin America by the great powers of the presidency. From a comparative perspective, Brazil gives as much formal agenda power to the president as any other case we know. Yet at the same time, Brazilian presidents do not always command legislative majorities. We argue that this combination produces a distinctive pattern of agenda control. If the president appoints a partisan

cabinet; combines his agenda powers with those of the majority coalition with which he is cooperating; and then subordinates his use of agenda power to overall coalition guidance, then what we call a presidentially-led agenda cartel forms and can be reasonably effective in controlling the legislative agenda (a necessary but not sufficient step toward controlling legislative output). If, in contrast, the president appoints non-partisan politicians and pursues a shifting-coalition strategy in the assembly, then no agenda cartel can form: any attempt to do so cannot succeed in the face of the president's tremendous powers to interrupt the agenda.

If Brazilian presidents always chose to form cartels, then our positions would be similar to that of Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2000). These authors contend that *all* Brazilian presidents since 1988 have colluded with party leaders to use their agenda and patronage powers to buy off the support of blocs of deputies. In their words, "Presidents 'form a government' in the same way as prime ministers do in multiparty systems ..." (1999, p. 101).

We agree that all presidents have formed support coalitions. However, the nature of the support coalitions for Brazilian presidents and European Prime Ministers differs substantially as regards the cabinet and legislative agenda. Prime Ministers must constantly maintain majority support in the parliament.²³ To this end, they typically appoint a cabinet of legislative party leaders; and they negotiate a legislative agenda with their partners that will be acceptable to all (lest a disgruntled partner defect on a vote of confidence and bring down the coalition). Brazilian presidents, in contrast, have more options. Their continuance in office does not require constantly maintaining a majority in the legislature.

²³ Even minority governments must maintain a majority who tolerate their existence.

Thus, some Presidents—such as Collor, Franco and Sarney—have chosen to rule more by decree, to appoint more technocratic or crony-based cabinets, and not to negotiate their legislative agenda with a stable majority support coalition. Unlike a typical majority parliamentary government, legislative supporters of these presidents had no guaranteed voice in setting the agenda. On the other hand, some Presidents—only Cardoso thus far, according to our figures—have chosen to rule more through statutes, to appoint more partisan cabinets, and to agree on a legislative agenda that all pivotal members of a stable support coalition—or agenda cartel—can live with. Given our findings on how the various parties have voted on agenda-setting votes, we would view only Cardoso as operating in a parliamentary style.

We believe that Brazil’s legislative politics are neither consistently “atomistic” (per Ames 2001) nor consistently “parliamentary” (per Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). Instead, the pattern of governance in Brazil depends on an initial strategic choice made by the president, in light of the lay of the political land (per Amorim Neto 1998; Cox and Morgenstern 2001). In future, more work needs to be done about the determinants of this initial presidential choice.

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**Table 1: Roll Rates on Project and Agenda-Setting Votes, by Legislative-
Presidential Period and
Party in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies (1989-1999)**

Legislative-Presidential Period	N of Roll Calls	PT	PDT	PSDB	PMDB	PTB	PFL	PPB
48th-Sarney (01/09-03/90)	18	88.9	77.8	38.9	0	16.7	5.6	11.1
48th-Collor (03/90-01/91)	11	100	100	36.4	18.2	0	0	0
49th-Collor (02/91-10/92)	38	73.7	52.6	36.8	5.3	10.5	15.8	23.7
49th-Franco (10/92-12/94)	25	72.0	52.0	8.0	4.0	16.0	16.0	20.0
49th-Cardoso (01/95)	7	85.7	71.4	0	0	0	0	0
50th-Cardoso (02/95-01/99)	154	88.3	79.9	1.9	3.2	4.5	1.9	6.5

Table 2: Extended-Beta Binomial Models For the Yearly Roll Frequency of the Big Seven Parties^a

Dependent Variable: YEARLY ROLL FREQUENCY		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
<i>Beta</i>		
LAGGED ROLL	.022 (.014)	.019 (.012)
CABINET TIME PER SEAT	-.452* (.261)	
BUDGET SHARE PER SEAT		-.969*** (.280)
PT	3.769*** (.550)	3.928*** (.450)
PDT	3.167*** (.517)	3.280*** (.471)
PSDB	.904* (.516)	1.235** (.487)
PTB	.711 (.523)	.781 (.492)
PFL	.216 (.540)	1.126** (.545)
PPB	.608 (.501)	.563 (.464)
<i>Gamma</i>		
CONSTANT	.044** (.018)	.024 (.015)
N of observations	63	63
Log likelihood	-511.755	-507.482
Pseudo R-squared	.450	.455

Note: Link function is logit.


^aStandard errors are indicated in parentheses.

*** p > 0.01; ** p > 0.05; * p > 0.1.

Table 3: Executive-Initiated Statutory Bills and Constitutional Amendments, and Decree-Laws per Legislative-Presidential Period

Legislative-Presidential Period	Statutory Bills (SB)	Constitutional Amendments (CA)	Decree-Laws (DL)	Index of Standard Legislative Initiatives (SLI) = (SB+CA)/(SB+CA+DL)
48th-Sarney (01/89-03/90)	131	0	109	0.55
48th-Collor (03/90-01/91)	64	0	73	0.47
49th-Collor (02/91-10/92)	204	2	11	0.95
49th-Franco (10/92-12/94)	252	3	152	0.63
49th-Cardoso (01/95)	0	0	3	0.00
50th-Cardoso (01/95-01/99)	543	30	155	0.79

Source: Brazil – Senado Federal (1999), and data provided by Argelina C. Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi.

**Figure 1**

